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1. 
Gabolinscy v Hamilton City Corporation 
In this paper, I propose to examine the approach taken by 
Moller Jin deciding Gabolinscy v Hamilton City Corporation (1) and 
incidentally to observe whether the sequence of the issues discussed 
in the case were in the appropriate order as was required. Finally to 
analyse each issue in turn and to question the validity of the conclusion. 
The facts of Gabolinscy v Hamilton City Corporation 
The land was negligently filled by the defendant in the capacity 
of owner/subdivider/lessor. It was leased to the plaintiff on condition 
that it was for the erection of a house. The lessor as local authority 
had control over the work of the builder. As a result of the negligent 
filling of the land, damage by settlement of the land occurred which 
required substantial cost for repair. The plaintiff brought an action for 
repair costs and general damages. 
The issues of Gabolinscy were as follows: 
1) Whether a duty of care in tort could be imposed on the defendant. 
2) To determine whether the repair cost was property damage or economic 
loss. 
3) To examine whether the Limitation Act 1950 was applicable to the 
situation in Gabolinscy. 
4) Could an implied warranty be inferred from the totality of the 
circumstances in the case. 
5) To determine whether it was possible to recover damages for 
inconvenience and worry. 
( 1) (1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 157 - A Supreme Court decision. 
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Could the liability of the defendant in the capacity of subdivider 
arise in contract as well as in tort? 
In McLaren Maycroft & Co v Fletcher (2) ,it was held that where a 
professional man's relationship with his client is contractual, the true 
nature of an action brought against the professional man for amage 
caused by lack of proper professional skill and care is an action founded 
upon contract alone. 
In J. Nunes Diamond Ltd v Dominion Electric Protection Co. (3) 
Pigeon J said: 
"The basis of tort liability considered in Hedley Byrne 
is inapplicable to any case where the relationship between 
the parties is governed by a contract, unless then gligence 
relied on can properly be considered as 'an independent tort' 
unconnected with the performance of that contract as expressed 
in Elder, Dempster & Co. Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co. Ltd (4)." 
A similar view was expressed by Greer L.J. in Javis v Moy, Davies, Smith, 
Vandervell and C<;?_ (5). 
It is submitted that the view of Pigeon J seems to be of general 
application in that if the parties are governed by contract, no tort 
liability coula arise unless it is an "independent tort" not related to 
the performance of the contract at all. 
(2) [1973) 2 N. Z.L.R.100 see p.102, line 15, p.115, line 52, see also 
Bevan Investment Ltd v Blackhall and Struthers [1973] 2 N.Z.L.R.45. 
A solicitor Clark v Kirby (1964] Ch.506. 
An architect Bagot v Stevens Scanlan and Co. Ltd [1966] l Q.B.197. 
A stockbroker Jarvis v Moy, Davis, Smith, Vandervell and Co. [1936] 
1 K.D.399. 
(3) [1972] 26 D.L.R. (3d) 699, see p. 727, p. 728. 
(4) [1924] A.C.522 at p.548. 
(5) [1936] 1 K.B.399, 405 and Lord Diplock L.J. in Bagot v Stevens 
Scanlan and Co. Ltd [1966] 1 .B. 297 at p.205 considered the view 
expressed by Greer L.J. to be an accurate statement of the law. The 
Bagot's decision was followed by McLaren. 
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Was the subdivider under a contract with the plaintiff to fill the land? 
In Gabolinscy, there was no contract between the subdivider and 
plaintiff to fill and subdivide the land as it was subdivided and filled 
before the plaintiff leased it. In the absence of a contract between the 
subdivider and plaintiff, could tort liability be imposed on the subdivider? 
Since the negligent filling of the land by the subdivider was an independent 
tort unconnected with the performance of the contract, an action, in tort 
would lie as supported by J. Nunes Diamond Ltd v Dominion Electric 
Protection Co. 
~ubdividers posoess special skill and knowledge. Since they hold 
themselves ou·t as being capable of subdividing land, they are expected to 
exercise skill and competence of an ordinary, reasonable member of the 
profession because their clients rely on t heir skill and knowledge. It is 
submitted that it is desirable to impose a duty of care on the subdivider 
as well as other professional people with skill for the purpose of protecting 
foreseeable damages to third parties by their negligent acts (6). 
Since tort liability was independent of the contract (which was not 
even present in Gabolinscy) the subdivider could be liable in tort. 
In Dutton both Lord Denning and Sachs L.J. were prepared to impose 
tor tiousliability on the builder for the negligent filling of the land. 
They extended this liability to the defendant for ne~ligent supervision. 
It is submitted that the builder in Dutton was not liable in tort because 
his negligent acts were connected to the performance of the contract for 
building the house. Limitation period would commence from the time of the 
breach. I respectfully submit that the court in Dutton was too anxious 
(6) See Charlesworth on Negligence 5th ed Sweet and Maxwell, Chapter 7. 
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to hold that the builder was liable in tort exce
pt Stamp L.J. (7). The 
issue of whether a person under a contract is lia
ble in contract alone or 
could be liable in tort as well was not discusse
d in the case. 
It must be emphasised that although the builder 
and the subdivider in 
Dutton and Gabolinscy were negligent in filling 
the land, the subdivider in 
the latter could not be liable in contract as th
ere was no contract to 
subdivide the land. Tortious liability could be
 imposed on him as this was 
clearly an independent tort not connected to the
 performance of the contract. 
In Dutton because the negligent filling was rela
ted to the performance of 
the contract, following the decision in Nunes no
 tortious liability could 
arise. 
Could the defendant in the capacity of landlord 
be liable in tort or 
contract? 
Apart from the tenancies which subsist by virtue
 of statute (8), a 
tenancy or lease is based on an agreement betwee
n the landlord and tenant 
thereby giving rise to a contractual relationshi
p. The general rule is 
that apart from contract the landlord is under n
o duty to his tenant as 
to the state of the demised premises (9). 
Hence prin~ facie, no separate tortious liability
 could be imposed 
on the lessor and the only action available agai
nst the lessor is in contract. 
(7) (1972] 2 W.L.R. p.305 at p.329 Stamp L.J. sai
d "To hold that either the 
builder or manufacturer was liable except in con
tract would be to open 
up a new field of liability the extent of which 
could not, I think, be 
logically controlled. " 
See Hancock v Brazier 1 W.L.R. p.1317. 
Billyack v Leyland Construction Co. Ltd (1968] l 
W.L.R. 471. 
(8) See Hill and Redman - Law of Landlord and Te
nant 15th ed. p.6 para [2}. 
(9) Charlesworth on Negligence 5th ed Sweet and M
axwell, para (377]. The 
issue of whether a lessor is under a duty of care
 to lessee will be 
discussed more fully later in the paper. 
< . -. ---PI 
3 
r· 
r-
r+-
0 
::) 
I f) 
r-. 
M-
Ta Gabolliiscy v. unil-
5. 
In Gabolinscy the negligent filling and subdividing was done prior to the 
lease (contract). Thus there was no contractual duty prior to the lease to
 
see that the land was fit for building. Later, in the lease, no written 
terms regarding the fitness of the land were mentioned. Hence in the 
absence of any terms which gave rise to contractual duties under the 
contract, no action would lie against the lessor in contract. 
It is submitted that an action could lie in contract against the lessor 
if the negligent filling and subdividing were done after the execution of 
the lease by a separate contract between lessor and lessee with terms that 
impose contractual liability upon the lessor. 
In Gabolinscy it was desirable and permissible to impose tortious 
liability on the subdivider (10) but it must be emphasised that because of 
the simultaneous existence of the lease in Gabolinscy no duty of care could
 
be imposed on the subdivider. In Dutton the majority of the court had 
erroneously imposed tortious liability upon the builder. In essence 
because of the very existence of the lease in Gabolinscy which was absent 
in Dutton, the latter could be distinguished on this ground and therefore 
not an authority to be followed by Moller J. 
Did the Council in the capacity of owner/subdivider/lessor owe a duty 
of care to the plaintiff (lessee)? 
Moller Jin the present case made two extensions. 
1) In relation to the duty of care, he extended the duty to cover a 
subdivider. 
2) His Honour further extended the rule in Dutton which was not a case 
involving a contract (lease) between the parties, to the present case 
(10) but not in Dutton as discussed previously. 
a Go. boli.nscy v. IIE>Jll:!.1-
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which was principally based on a contractual relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Could a duty of care be inq,osed on the subdivider? 
It was foreseeable that damage or harm would result if the subdivider
 
did not exercise reasonable skill and car in filling the land. In
 order to 
protect innocent people from harm and to discourage negligent acts wh
icn 
would have adverse effects on society as a whole, it would be desir
able 
to impose a duty of care Oh the subdivider. It would not be agains
t public 
policy consider tions to do so as in Ho Office v Dorset Yacht Co 
(ll). 
With reference to the second extension of the rule in Dutton v 
Bognor Regis UDC (12), the council in that case was neither vendor
/builder/ 
l ssor. The duty of care which w s imposed on the coWlcil was not dire
ctly 
imposed on the council. Since Lord Denning and Sacls L.J. were pr p
ared to 
hold the builder/vendor liable, the court extended the duty of care
 to the 
council. Lord Denning in Dutton expressly dealt with the liability
 of the 
builder/vendor in detail and analysed the leading cases which relate
d 
to the builder being the owner as well. lie overruled the leading d
ecision 
of Otto v Bolton (13), a decision subsequent to Donaghue v Stevenson 
(14). 
He did not draw a distinction between builder/owner or builder/cont
ractor. 
Furthermore there was no distinction between chattels and real prop
erty in 
imposing a Juty of care on the tortfeasor. In Dutton, the court held 
that 
the builder/owner owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and extended
 it to 
(ll) [1970) A.C.1004 see Lord Reid's judgement especially p.1032, 10
33. 
(12) (1972] l Q.B. 373. 
(13) [1936] 2 K.B. 46. 
(14) [1932] A.C. 562. 
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the council for negligent supervision of the bad and negligent work of the 
builder/owner. 
If the defendant's capacity in Gabolinscy was only owner/subdivider 
perhaps by applying the principle of Donaghue v Stevenson to realty a duty 
of care could arise as the defendant was negligent in filling the land. In 
Gallagher v N. McDowell Ltd (15) Lord MacDermott C.J. and his colleagues in 
Northern Ireland (CA) held that a contractor who built a house negligently 
was liable to a person injured by his negligence. This was followed by 
Nield Jin Sharp v E.T. Sweeting and Son Ltd (16). But the judges in 
those cases confined themselves to cases in which the builder was only a 
contractor and not builder/owner. The latter was exempted from liability 
because of the authority of Bottomley v Bannister (17). 
In Bottomley it was not a simple case of builder/vendor, as before 
the house was completed, the builder entered into a lease with the plaintiff 
to go into possession before completion as tenant at will. The builder 
agreed to complete the house by the end of October 1929. But the tragedy 
occurred on 26 October 1929 (that was during the period when the lease was 
still in existence). Despite the fact that the house was sold to the 
purchaser, the agreement contained the clause of tenancy at will which had 
not expired then. There still remained the lessor and lessee relationship. 
It was held in Bottomley that there was no evidence of a breach of any duty 
which the law cast upon the defendant as vendor or lessor of the house 
towards the lessee and the plaintiff could not recover. It is submitted 
that the above case was rightly decided upon its facts (18). 
(15) [1961) N.I. 26. 
(16) [1963] 1 W.L.R. 665. 
(17) [1932) l K.B. 458. 
(18) Bottomley followed the decision of Robbin v Jones (1863) 15 C.B. 
(N.S.) 221. Lane v Cox [1897] l Q.B.415 and Cavalier v Pope [1906) 
A.C. 428. 
• 
< • 
Ta Gabolirwcy • Ilam.:.1-
ton Citv ~.,._.. H ,..... 
8. 
In Dutton, Lord Denning overruled Bottomley on the basis that if 
a builder was liable, similarly a builder/owner must also be liable. 
Throughout the discussion of Bottomley there was no mention of the lease 
between the builder/owner and the purchaser. The plaintiff failed in his 
action because of the application of the rule in Robbin v Jones (19) 
where Erle C.J. said 
"A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous stat is not 
liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents 
happening during the term for fraud apart, tiler is no law 
against letting of tumbledown house and the tenant's remedy" 
is upon his contract if any." 
This proposition was approved ~y the House of Lords in Cavalier v Pope 
(20). It is submitted that the Robbin v Jones rule applies where there is 
landlord and tenant relationship. According to Clerk & Lindsell on torts (21) 
"It should be borne in mind, in the first place that the Occupier's 
Liability Act 1957, imposes on a landlord the common duty of 
care towards all lawful visitors, but only when he is under an 
obligation to repair. To this extent Cavalier_ v Pope has been 
overruled by the Act, but the other aspect of the case which 
concerns non liability for letting ruinous prendses still 
holds good." 
In Dutton, neither Lord Denning nor Sachs L.J. drew a distinction 
between builder/owner or builder/contractor. Lord Denning relied on the 
House of Lords decision in Billing v Riden (22) and overruled Otto v Bolton 
(23) a post Donaghue v Stevenson decision. Bottomley and Cavalier v Pope 
(the latter two cases were pre Donaghue v Stevenson decisions) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(1863) 15 C.B. (N.S.) 221, 240. 
[1906] A.C. 562. 
13th ed Sweet and Maxwell publication p.867, 
(22) [1958) A.C. 240. 
(23) [1936] 2 K.B. 46. 
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Sachs L.J. said (24) 
"On the contrary as Lord MacDermott himself in Gallagher's 
case (25) held "The doctrine of Donaghue v Stevenson can 
apply to defective houses as well as defective chattels" 
and in my judgement there is no exception behind which 
landowners can shelter. Thus the Bottomley v Bannister 
point fails." 
Stamp L.J. was of the opinion that a builder was not liable except 
in contract, and then only to immediate purchaser for defects in goods 
which rendered them unfit for their purposes. To hold that either the 
builder or manufacturer was liable, except in contract would be to open 
up a new field of liability the extent of which could not be logically 
controlled. It is submitted that the majority's view in Dutton is 
preferred on the ground that it is justified in keeping up with the 
changing needs of a modern society like Iew Zealand. But I further 
submit that Dutton was concerned with a case of builder/owner and was 
clearly not a lessor/lessee situation. It must be emphasised that 
although the court overruled Bottomley and other cases, with reference 
to Bottomley the court distinguished it only on the basis of builder/owner 
capacity and not on the basis of lessor/lessee relationship. Therefore I 
respectfully submit that Dutton is not an authority to be followed in 
Gabolinscy as the addition of the capacity of lessor to that of subdivider/ 
owner of the defendant made a great difference to the situation. The crux 
of the issue was the existence of the lease. As the subdivision and 
negligent filling of the land was done prior to the lease, apart from any 
express or implied contract to that effect, a landlord owed no duty either 
towards his tenant or any other person who entered upon the premises during 
the tenancy, to take care that the premises were safe either at the 
conunencement of tenancy or during its continuance (26). It is subIIll.cted 
(24) (1972] 2 W.L.R. p.317. 
(25) [1961] N.I. 26, 41. 
(26) See Woodfall - Landlord and Tenant vol. (1) 27th ed. Sweet and 
Maxwell p.655, 656. 
See also Clerk & Lindsell on T~l3th ed para (867] Sweet and Maxwell. 
a Gabolinscy v. rr unil-
ton Ci 1:v CA,._.. H ...... 
10. 
that the lessee must take the land as it stands. The above proposition was 
supported by English, Canadian and New Zealand aut.~orities namely, Travers 
v Gloucester Corporation (27}, MacDonald v Goderich (28} which followed 
Robbin v Jones, Collins v Torrens (29), Titus v Duke (30}. 
The New Zealand Authority in support of the proposition was 
Felton v Brightwell (31). It was held in this case by Wild C.J. that apart 
from express stipulation, there is no obligation on a lessor during the term 
of the lease to repair or maintain improvements. A lessee must take land 
as he finds it and there is no convenant or condition implied by law that 
the land that is leased is fit for the purpose for which it is taken. 
Felton followed Gott v Grandy (32} and Sutton v Temple (33). 
In Gott v Grandy the tenants of the workshops and .buildings claimed 
to recover from their landlord in respect of his failure to repair a 
chiIIU1ey which was part and parcel of the premises and which without any 
neglect or default on their part, got into an insecure state and fell 
down. It was held that the duties between landlord and tenant arise from 
contract and that, since there was no contract requiring the landlord to 
repair, he was not bound to do so. It is submitted that there is no 
liability in tort for letting dangerous premises to anyone who suffers 
injury on the premises (34). This rule was laid down in Robbin v Jones 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
( 3 3) 
[1947] 
[1949] 
[1956] 
[1963] 
[1967) 
(1853) 
(1843) 
K. B . 71. 
3 D.L.R. 788, 793. 
3 D.L. R. 74 0. 
6 W.I.R. 135, 137. 
N.Z.L.R.276 (Supreme Court decision) • 
2 E. & B. 845. 
12 M & W. 52 . 
(34) The above view is also that of Salmond on the Law of Torts 16th ed 
Sweet and Maxwell p.297 and consistent to that of Charlesworth on 
Negligence 5th ed (1971) published by Sweet and Maxwell para 377, 
378. Para 401 on liability of vendor or lessor. 
Ta Ga.bolinscy v. !.nU.l-
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which was a long standing rule and regarded as'beyond question' (35) and 
not to have been affected by the general liberalisation of the law of 
negligence in recent decades (36). The Robbin v Jones rule extended to 
dangerous conditions arising from negligent act of misfeasance by lessor 
who committed it prior to the lease as was the installation of a defective 
system of gas in Travers v Gloucester Cooporation (37). Briefly the 
facts of Travers were as follows: The vent pipe of a geyser terminated 
against the outside wall of a house, built under the direction of the 
archjtect of, and owned by, a municipal corporation, was let by them to 
thE: laintiff. The installation of the geyser was dangerous and the 
defect had been brougnt to the attention of the responsible officials 
of the corporation by the local gas company. A lodger of the tenant 
was gassed and died in the bathroom of the house as a result of the 
defective and dangerous installation. 
The court held that there was no legal duty incumbent on the 
corporation as the builder, owner or landlord towards the lodger to take 
care in the provision of the installation. Even if the tenant was the 
victim and not the lodger it is submitted that the remedy was only in 
contract as set out by the court in earlier cases (38). 
The facts in Travers appeared to be similar to Gabolinscy in that 
the damage was caused by the negligent act of the defendant (a statutory 
(35) [1906] A.C.428, 430. 
(36) Auto Scooter Ltd v Chambers [1966] E.G.D.57 contra Dutton v Bognor 
Regis UDC [1972] l Q.B.373, the defendant was neither the owner/ 
builder of the defective premises. This observation was expressed 
by Salnond, Law of Torts 11th ed Sw et and Maxwell p.296 footnote 54. 
(37) [1947] K.B. 71. 
(38) A.L.J. volume 20 Negligence - Donaghue v Stevenson 
Application to Realty p.483, 484. 
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body). Gabolinscy could be distinguished from Travers in that 
1) The former was not aware of the defect in the land. 
2) The damage done was only to property and not personal injury which 
resulted in death. 
Hence there are stronger grormds in Gabolinscy for refusing liability. 
On the basis of Donaghue v Stevenson, the defendant would still 
be liable to the plaintiff in negligence though connected with realty. 
Moller J started off the discussion of the defendant's liability in tort 
in the capacity of owner/subdivider/lessor {39) and concluded his analysis 
by holding that a duty of care arises in the case of a defendant in the 
capacity of owner/subdivider (40). The most crucial word of 'lessor' was 
missing. It was desirable to extend the duty of care to a subdivider 
(as discussed previously) as it was not.practical to draw a distinction 
between owner/builder and owner/subdivider. Since in both cases the 
negligent filling of the land was done by the builder and subdivider 
respectively. It is submitted that the extension of the duty of care to 
the subdivider in this regard was desirable and welcomed. 
In Gabolinscy because of the presence of the lease, this was a bar 
to the imposition of a duty of care on the defendant. As the present law 
stands in Canada, England, and New Zealand, is not in favour of imposing 
a duty of care on the lessor. But in England via the Defective Premises 
Act 1972 S4 the landlord is under certain obligations towards the tenant (41). 
With Robbin v Jones and ravers still existing as good law, it is 
submitted with regrets that no duty of care arises between a landlord 
towards his tenant in tort. 
(39) [1975] l N.Z.L.R. 150, see p.154 , line 36. 
(40) (1975] l N.Z.L.R. 150, see p.156, line 24. 
(41) See Halsbury Law of England 1974 Cumulative Supplement Butterworth 
vol. 28, para 50. 
Ta Ga.bolinscy v. llnm.:!.1-
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Could the damage for repair of the house be recoverable? 
The court in Gabolinscy allowed damages for 
1) Cost of repair 
2) Engineering fee. 
Both these headings would include not only repair of the present or 
actual property damage caused to the house, but also would include repair 
to prevent future foreseeable damage which would be likely to materialise 
if repair was not done then. Thus these future foreseeable damages would 
be categorised under economic loss as it does not flow from direct physical 
loss. 
According to the recent decision of Spartan v Steel (42), it was held 
by the majority that if negligent act causes physical damage or personal 
injury these losses are recoverable. In addition consequential economic 
loss which is immediate to the physical damage or personal injury is also 
recoverable. Decision in Spartan was consistent and in line with the 
earlier cases on this issue (economic loss) namely, cattle v Stockton 
Waterworks Co. (43), SCM v Whittall (44). 
In Spartan v Steel (supra) Lord Denning suggested five policy factors 
which militated against the awarding of damages to the plaintiff's steel 
manufacturer for economic loss suffered when the power supply was interrupted. 
1) Statutory boards were not liable for conduct similar to that of the 
defendant (an independent contractor). 
2) The nature of the hazard involved. 
3) The difficulty of checking the many claims which might ensue if this 
claim was allowed. 
(42) (1973] l Q.B.27. 
(43) (1875) L.R.10 Q.B.453. 
(44) [1971] 1 Q.B. 337. 
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4) The fact that the plaintiff's loss was better borne by the community 
rather than by one person. 
5) The fact that the plaintiff could recover the economic loss truly 
consequential on physical damage and was therefore not entirely without 
remedy. 
The traditional rule of non liability for economic loss had its origin 
in public policy. The starting point was the 1875 decision of 
Cattle v The Stockton Waterworks Company (45). Blackburn J ruled that, 
to allow the plaintiff to advance a claim for extra expenses incurred in 
a contract because of the defendant's conduct, would take redress far 
beyond the "proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts". It 
would mean that a defendant whose negligence resulted in the shutdown of a 
mine or factory would be liable for all lost profits and wages, a result 
precluded by "a wise consciollSness" of the Court's limitation. 
Contrary to the above was the most recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works (46). This 
decision was directly contrary to the English authorities. The majority in 
Rivtow preferred the dictum of Salmond L.J. in Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government v Sharp (47) describing it as accurate and succinct 
"So far, however, as the law of negligence relating to 
civil actions is concerned, the existence of a duty to take 
reasonable care no longer depends on whether it is physical 
injury or financial loss which can reasonably be foreseen as 
a result of a failure to take such care." 
The Supreme Court of Canada 1 as, therefore, rejected the position 
that there is a special rule restricting the recovery of economic loss 
(45) (1874-5) L.R.10 Q.B.453. 
(46) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530 reversing the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal [1972] 3 W.W.R.735 and restoring the decision of 
Ruttan J 74 W.W.R.110. 
(47) [1970] 2 Q.B. 223. 
Ta Ga.bolinscy v. II "'1-
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in negligent cases, and has also rejected the suggestion that has 
occasionally appeared that the test for liability for economic loss 
is foreseeability of physical harm (48). 
The facts of Rivtow in brief were as follows. The defendants 
manufactured cranes, one of which was sold via dealers to the plaintiff. \ 
The plaintiff installed it on a barge and used it for the purposes of 
their business of transporting logs up and down waterways. Upon learni~g 
that a crane of similar design, made by the defendants had collapsed 
due to faulty design, the plaintiff ordered the barge to be returned for 
inspection and repair. An action was taken to recover the cost of the 
repairs and consequential loss of the services of the barge for thirty 
days which happened to be during the most profitable time of the year 
(i.e. for pure economic loss). 
The majority of the court allowed the recovery for pure economic 
loss (i.e. the loss of profit) though not the repair cost. But it is 
submitted that to allow recovery of pure economic loss is sufficient to 
create a new milestone in the law of negligence (49). The nine judges in 
Rivtow were unanimous on one important point and that was that liability 
in negligence no longer dependended on whether the foreseeable loss was 
physical or merely economic. But in considering the rules controlling the 
incidence of liability for economic loss, there was no such unanimity. The 
court was divided 7:2. 
Ritchie Jin delivering the majority judgement, relied on a much 
criticised dichotomy in negligence between cases of articles. 
(48) See Widgery Jin Weller v Foot and Mouth Diseasa Research (1966) 
l Q.B.569. 
Also refer to Atiyah, "Negligence and Economic Loss" (1967] 
83 L.Q.Rev.248 at p.260-261.Laskin Jin his judgement in Rivtow 
made the same suggestion. 
Sees. M. Waddams - Product Liability - Duty to warn - Economic Loss -
The Canadian Bar Review (1974] vol. 52, p.101. The author approved 
of the view. 
(49) Christopher Harvey; Modern Law Review (1974] Vol. 37, p.320-324. 
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a) dangerous per se and 
b) dangerous through negligence, i.e. negligent design in this case. 
He then held that liability on bases of (b) did not extend to pure economic 
loss in cases where the defendant was unaware of the danger. Liability 
on the basis (a) on the contrary did extend to pure economic loss. The 
fact that the defendant would always know of the danger in this case justified 
the extension of liability. The learned judge then decided that Rivtow 
fell within the ambit of (a) because the defendants had actual knowledge 
of the danger previously. This gave rise to a duty to warn, breach of 
which led directly to certain economic loss, which was the profit which 
could have arisen if the crane was not taken away for repair. Liability for 
repair cost was denied because that loss did not flow from the breach of 
the duty to warn under category (a) but from breach of the co:mxron duty of 
care under category (b), where recovery for economic loss was excluded (50). 
Laskin J (now C.J.C.) with Hall J concurring followed a bolder course 
of reasoning. He would have enlarged the scope of liability for economic loss 
in this case to include the repair cost as well. The learned judge did not 
follow the traditional analysis of 'duty' and 'renoteness' and based his 
decision on a more reliable foundation which he called the "rationale of 
manufacturer's liability for negligence." 
Laskin J said (51) 
"That liability rests upon a conviction that manufacturers 
should bear the risk of injury to consumers or users of 
their products when such products are carelessly manufactured 
because the manufacturers create the risk in the carrying 
of their enterprises, and they will be xoore likely to safeguard 
the members of the public to whom their products are marketed 
if they must stand behind them as safe products to conswne or 
(50) For critisms of the majority's view see p. 322 of footnote (49). 
(51) [1973) 6 W.W.R. p.715. 
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to use. They are better able to insure against such risks, 
and the cost of insurance, as a business expense can be spread 
with less pain among the buying public than would be the case 
if an injured conswner or user is saddled with the entire loss 
that befalls him." 
"'l'his rationale embraces, in my opinion, threatened physical harm 
from a negligently designed and manufactured product resulting 
in economic loss" 
since the prerequisites of liability were fulfilled namely 
a) foreseeability of injury to person or p r operty. 
b) the direct nature of economic loss (52). 
Thus economic loss was allowed. 
In Gabolinscy Moller J did not discuss any of the cases discussed 
previously. His Honour treated this issue similar to Dutton•s approach 
by classifying the damage for repair as physical loss. I respectfully 
submit that this issue of whether the damage is of economic nature or 
purely physical is vital in view of its novelty nature and also because of 
the conflicting English and Canadian authorities. Although this issue on 
damage is of importance, it is still subsidiary to the issue of establishing 
a duty of care which is the crux of the case. Moller J approved of the 
view taken by Lord Denning and Sachs L.J. that the damage was physical 
and not economic loss. 
Lord Denning in Dutton, when he considered c0Wlsel 1 s contention 
that the liability of the district council must be "limited to those who 
suffered bodily narm, and could not extend to those who only suffered 
economic loss" described this as an "impossible distinction" (53). But 
(52) For a full analysis of the concepts controlling liability in economic 
loss cases, see Christopher Harvey, "Economic Losses and egligence: 
The Search for a Just Solution". [1972] 50 Can. Bar Rev. 580. 
Also see F. James, "Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused 
by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal" [1972] 12 J.S.P.T.L. 105. 
(53) [1972] 1 Q.B. 373, 396. 
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one must not disregard the clear distinction between physical and economic 
loss (which was based on policy decision} in Spartan v Steel (54}. Further 
Professor H. V. Heuston (55} has observed that the reluctance to grant 
remedy for the careless invasion of financial or pecuniary interest is long 
standing, deep rooted and not unreasonable. This observation was cited 
with approval by Barrowclough C.J. in Furniss v Fitchett (56}. 
Sachs L.J. went even further and adopted Salmond L.J. in Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government v Sharp (57} where Salmon L.J. did not draw 
a distinction between physical injury or financial loss which coulct reasonably 
be foreseen as a result of a failure to take such care. This approach was 
also adopted by Ritchie Jin his delivery of the majority's view in Rivtow. 
The above passage quoted both by Sachs L.J. and later by Ritchie J 
was treated by Winn L.J. as being wholly obiter (58). The learned judge 
said: 
"I must respectfully indicate that I'm unable to concur in the 
full breadth of that remark . There is nothing in Dorset Yacht Ltd 
v Home Office (59} as I r e ad i t which t ouches upon t he question 
whether or not there is an important distinction in relation to 
claims to recover damages for negligence between foresight of 
physical injury or damage to property on one hand, and foresight 
of economic loss alone on the other. The negligence for which 
liability was imposed in this case consisted of failing to 
take due care to prevent borstal boys under the control of the 
defendant's officers from causing damage to the plaintiff." 
(54) 5 months later than Dutton where Lord Denning took a different view. 
(55} Salmond on Torts 15th ed (1969} p.262 published by Sweet and Maxwell. 
(56) [1958) N.Z.L.R. 396, p.401 . 
(57) [1970) 2 Q.B. 223. 
(58) SCM v Whittall [1971] l Q.B. 337, p.350, 
(59} [1970) A.C.1004. 
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The Dutton authority relied on by Moller J could be supported by 
the dissenting judgement of Edmund Davies L.J. (60). 
From the above discussion it is submitted that the reasoning of the 
minority in Rivtow which was based on the rationale of manufacturers' 
liability for negligence which embraced, threatened physical harm from 
negligently designed and manufactured products resulting in econo~ic loss 
is very sound, logical and far better keeps pace with the changing needs of 
society. It is submitted that in view of the Donaghue v Stevenson 
neighbour principle, the above rationale should be extended to realty in 
the interest of justice and of balancing the interest between society 
as a whole and the negligent tortfeasor. But the decision of t.11e majority 
in Rivtow was of limited application as could be illustrated below. 
1) Liability of the manufacturer was based on a failure of a duty to 
warn (it was assumed that the manufacturer was aware of the danger). 
This clearly limited the decision to facts similar to Rivtow. 
2) The splitting of negligence between cases of articles into two 
categories. 
a) dangerous per se an<l 
b) dangerous through negligence imposed furtl1er limits~ 
3) The stressing of the particular fact that the defect caused immediate 
personal harm to the user of the crane by the majority (61) an<l 
minority in the judgement further reinforced the suggestion of limitation 
of the decision to the facts of the case. 
4) The reasoning of the majority in Rivtow, relying substantially on the 
remark of Salmond L.J., in ~harp, was not followed by English 
(60) Spartan v Steel [1972] 3 W.L.R. p.505, at p.517. 
(61) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, majority on p.542, minority on p.549. 
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authorities except by Sachs L.J. in Dutton which was only obiter. 
The court further relied on an obiter dictum by Lord Denning in 
SCM v Wh.ittal (62) where the learned judge said: 
"I must not be taken, however, as saying that economic loss 
is always too remote. " 
It is submitted that as regards economic loss the leading English 
authority is Spartan v Steel (63) which resolved the economic loss 
issue on policy grounds (64), which was contrary to Rivtow. This 
contrary view was expressly mentioned in the majority judgement (65). 
"I do not find it necessary to follow the sometimes winding 
paths leading to the formulation of a "policy decision"." 
The minority on the other hand dealt with the case as one where policy 
required that manufacturers should accept responsibility upon the 
rationale of manufacturers' liability for negligence whereby loss 
suffered would be recoverable. 
5) The majority only allowed for profit loss and not repair cost by 
drawing a clear distinction between them. Profit loss wa economic 
loss as it flowed from a breach of duty to war~ whilst repair cost 
did not flow from such a duty to warn. This was a clear indication 
of lirnicing economic loss to a defined area only. Although Laskin J 
and Hall J were prepared to allow repair cost as falling withi;i 
economic loss (66), nevertheless the grounds under which it could be 
included are (1) under the rationale of manufacturers' liability 
(2) not to penalise the plaintiff for trying to mitigate further 
loss as required .by the law. With reference to this later point I 
(6 2) See footnote (58). 
(63) [1973] l Q.B . p. 27. 
(64) [1973] 1 Q.E. p,27, only Lord Denning adopted this approach. 
(65) [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, at ~.547. 
(66) [1973] 6 W.W.R. p. 716. 
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respectfully submit that to remove the crane for repair during the 
peak period would not have minimised loss, unless this had bean done 
during the off period so that the crane could have been used during the 
peak period. However this argument could stand only if the crane 
could not have caused a danger to its operator. 
Could the decision in Rivtow be applicable to Gabolinscy? 
Rivtow was concerned with product liability an the liability was 
based on failure of a duty to warn of an article whici1 was dangerous per se
. 
'l'he damage to the house in Gabolinscy was under category (b) and hence not 
recoverable. In Gabolinscy there was no immediate threat to ph sica 
harm as distinct from Rivtow. It is submitted that Spartau v ... .: el is 
the present authoritative decision on the issue of economic los . Since 
the facts in Gabolinscy ."8rc not concerned with product liability and not 
akin to those of Rivtow it is unlikely that ~vtow could De applied. 
In conclusion it is subrnit t ~d that if a product liability casa 
like that of Rivtow is to arise in New ~ealand, it is likely that Rivtow 
could have persuasive influence over the court's decision especially the 
rationale of the minority which is reasonable, sound and logical. 
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Could the totality of the circumstances in the present case lead the 
court to decide that an implied warranty that the lease for land is 
fit for any particular purpose is permissible? 
At common law there is no implied warranty that the premises will 
be available for any purpose that the tenant may have in view (67). £ul't r
 
there is no implied promise to do any act necessary to render .e pr~M ses
 
available for the purpose for which they are known to be taken Newby v 
Sharpe (68). In addition at common law there is no implied warranty on th
e 
letting of unfurnished house or land, that as to its physical condition, 
it is or shall be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation
, 
nor is there any implied contract that it is physically fit for the purpos
e 
for which it is let (69). 
In a New Zealand decision of Balcairn Guest House Ltd v Weir (70), 
it was held that there iG not to be implied against the lessor a convenant
 
or warranty that such premises are fit for the purpose for which they are 
required to be used. 
Leicester J (71) said: 
"No authority has been fotmd which decided that there is 
any such warranty, what authority there is on the point is 
against its existence." 
In Sutton v Temple (72) a lessee must take land as he finds it and 
there is no convenant or condition implied by law that land that is leased
 
is fit for the purpose for which it is taken. 
(67) See Hill and Redman - Law of Landlor and Tenant 15 ed para 125. 
(68) See Halsbury Law of England 3rd ed vol. 23, para 1249, (1878) 8 Ch. p
.39. 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
See Charlesworth on Negligence 5 ed 1971, p.377. 
[1963] .Z.L.R. 301. 
[1963] N,Z.L.R. 301 at p.305. 
(1843) 12 M. & W. 52. 
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In Hart v Windsor (73) it was held that there is no implied warranty 
attached by law to a demise of land or premises that they are fit for any 
particular purpose. Other authorities in support of Hart v Windsor 
are Cruse v Mount (74). The intending tenant is presumed to make his own 
inquiries as to the condition of the premises and in the absence of special 
stipulation he takes the house as it stands (75). The fact that the lessor 
may have knowledge of serious defects will not in the absence of any 
warranty by him gives the tenant or anyone claiming Wlder him, any cause 
of action (76). 
In Bartram v Aldous (77), the court held that where a landlord 
lets an unfurnished house, there is no implied contract by him that it is 
fit for habitation. Following fro; this case, if there is no implied 
contract in the case of let ting unfurnished houses, then all the ioore there 
should not be an implied warranty to the lease of a piece of land where 
there is no immediate habitation. 
In Gabolinscy although there was a stipulation that the lease must 
be for the erection of a house, in view of the above discussion, especially 
in the light of Baron Parke judgement in Hart v Windsor and Weir , it is 
submitted that no warranty could be implied. Although the general rule is 
that there is no implied warranty that the lease is fit for the particular 
purpose, nevertheless there are two exceptions. 
1) 
2) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
At Common Law 
By Statute. 
(1844) 12 M. & W. 68. 
[1933] Ch.278, See also Hill v Harris [1965] 2 ALLER.358. 
See Halsbury Law of England vol. 23, 3rd ed. p.574. 
Cavalier v Pope [1906] Ac. 428, Hart v Windsor (supra) 
see also Edler v Auerbach 1950 1 K.B.359. 
Bull v London County Council 1949 2 K.B.159. 
(77) (1886) 2 T.L.R.237. 
Victo~·· 
I ibrary 
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At Conunon Law 
In the letting of a furnished house, a common law warranty that 
it is fit for habitation is given at the commenceraent of the tenancy_ 
By Statute 
i) In New Zealand by the application of the Tenancy Act 1955 (78) S47 
lists out the conditions implied in tenancies but subj et to the 
existences of total exemptions (SS6-9) and partial exemptions (SSl0-17). 
It is submitted that this Act is of very limited application. 
ii) S1l6H of the Property Law Amendment Bill 1974 would imply in every 
lease of a dwellinghouse -
a) a warranty by the lessor that the dwellinghouse was, at the 
commencement of the lease, in a fit and habitable condition for 
residential purposes, and 
b) a covenant by the lessor that he would throughout the term of tne 
lase k ep the dwellinghouse in a fit and habitable condition for 
residential purposes. 
It is submitced that because of the narrow application of the Tenancy 
Act, it does not apply to the Gabolinscy case. Further Sll6H would imply 
warranty in a lease of dwellinghouse and not to include the leas of a piece 
of land. Atcommon law it is well-established that no implied warranty 
is permissible. Since Gabolinscy doos not fall within th xceptions to 
the general rule, I respectfully submit that there is no implied warranty. 
(78) or the 'l'enancy Amendment Act 1957. 
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Could general damage be awarded for inconveni~ce and worry? 
Moller J himself conceded that the evidence was vague 
medical evidence to support the claim that the damage to the 
really caused the ill-health (personal injury). The worry on 
was suffered by the wife and there was absolutely no proof to 
and lacked 
house ha 
the contrary 
show that 
the damage did flow from personal injury caused by the damage to the ho
use. 
In the case of physical inconvenience and discomfort (79), if a 
plaintiff is physically injured, he may also suffer from inconvenience,
 
but such a loss would generally be included in the damages for pain and
 
suffering, and loss of amenities of life as was held in the case of 
Sheannan v Follanc'!, (80). But where the tort has resulted in some 
interference with the plaintiff's person short of physical injury, yet 
has caused him physical inconvenience, the latter must necessarily appe
ar 
as a separate head of dar.--, ge. Mr Gabolinscy in the present case seemed
 to 
be within this latter category. 
Damages for inconvenience could be awarded in the following 
situations. 
1) Deceit as in Mafo v Adams (81). 1'his was followed by a recent 
New Zealand decision of Foster v Public Trustee (82). Cook J said 
"On the principle illustrated by Doyle's case and Mafo v Adams 
- not affected as to this principle by anything said in 
Cassel & Co. Ltd v Broome" (83). 
2) False imprisonment - to recover for the loss of his liberty in the 
absence of physical injury. 
(79) McGregor - Law on Damages 13 ed published by Sweet and Maxwell, 
para [59] under the heading 2 Physical Inconvenience and Discomfort. 
(80) [1950] 2 K.B. 43, 50 (C.A.). 
(81) [1970] 1 Q.B. 548 (C.A.). 
(82) [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. p.26, p.29. 
(83) [1972] A.C. 1027. 
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3) Nuisance - Moore v Buchanan (84) where the plaintiff had been 
inconvenienced and annoyed by noise , interference with easement, 
and the like. 
Further it is possible to obtain damages for inconvenience in contract 
(85). The law of torts is not clear on this point, that is whether the 
inconvenience should be considered as a separate head of non-pecuniary loss 
or whether it can come within the term "suffering" is a matter which is 
devoid of clear authority. Asquith L.J. in Shearman v Folland (supra) 
seemed to put this head of damage for inconvenience under the pain and 
suffering heading for damage. A different view was advanced by Sachs L.J. 
in Dutton (86) who said: 
"Something for general inconvenience suffered whilst occupying 
the premises and for disturbance during repairs " 
are recoverable. 
At any rate, the present law relating to recovery for inconvenience 
alone does not proceed further than the above three categories. The 
wrong suffered by Mrs Gabolinscy could be classified as mental suffering 
because these two heads are very similar in their basic nature, that is 
the mental element is involved . According to the learned author (8 7), 
it is submitted that mental suffering is not by itself sufficient damage to 
ground an action which was emphasised by Devlin Jin Behrens v Bertran1 Mills 
Circus (88). His Honour said: 
"The general principle embedded in the conunon law is that mental 
suffering caused by grief, fear, and anguish and the like is 
not assessable. 0 
This was supported by Lynch v Knight (89) per Lord Wensleydale : 
(84) [1966] 197 E.G. 565. 
(85) McGregor - Law on Damages para [1140). 
(86) [1972] 2 W.L.R. p.305, at p.323. 
(87) McGregor - Law on Damages 13 ed published by Sweet and Maxwell 
at para (61]. 
(88) [1957] 2 Q.B.128. 
(C9 ) (1861) 9 H.L.C.577, 598. 
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"Mental pain or anxiety, the law cannot value, and does not 
pretend to redress when the unlawful act complained of causes 
that alone." 
Thus in view of the above mentioned authorities, it is submitted 
that the general damages for inconvenience and worry (which was described 
by the court as vague) ought not to be awarded especially in the absence 
of cogent evidence that this flowed from or was part and parcel of persona
l 
injury resulting from the damage to the house. 
The view that damages for fear, anxiety, etc is only recoverable 
if the plaintiff also sustains physical injuries is supported by the 
learned writer Harry Street (90). Street said: 
"Damages are also recoverable for fear, anxiety, neurosis 
and psychosis suffered by the victim of personal injuries." 
In order to reinforce my argument that in tort, there is no recovery 
for a separate head of torts for inconvenience and worry there is a statem
ent 
by the learned author Charles T. McCormick as follows (91): 
"One who sustains bodily injury may recover damages for 
past and future physical pain and serious mental suffering 
accompanying such injury or produced thereby •.•.•.. " 
To support this proposition is the case Bonelli v Branciere (92) where the
 
court referring to an earlier decision said 
"It was held that there could be no recovery for mental 
suffering (worry) unaccompanied with physical suffering, 
and that such mental suffering must be the outgrowtl1 or 
result of the physical suffering." 
Three situations where damage for mental suffering is allowed are 
1) Negligent act of the defendant caused physical injury - recoverable 
as compensatory damages. 
2) Breach of contract of marriage. 
(90) Harry Street, "Principle of Law of Damages" published by Sweet 
and Maxwell, p.69. 
(91) Charles 'I' . McCormick - "Damages" published by West Publishing Company
 
1935 at p.315. 
(92) 127 Miss 556, 90 so 245, 247 [1922]. 
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3) Wilful wrong, especially those affecting the liberty, character, 
reputation, personal security, or domestic relation of the injured party. 
I conclude that as the present law stands no recovery for inconvenience 
and worry sufferea is permissible in the absence of personal injury. 
The distinction between tort and contract for recovery of damage for 
inconvenience (93) is not based on any valid justification. Unless there 
are reasonable considerations to maintain the distinction, I submit that 
worry suffered in our present time would in most cases cause pecuniary 
loss directly or indirectly. Hence worry suffered independently of 
personal injury ought to be recoverable. The pioneering effort in this 
respect by Sachs L.J. in Dutton and Moller Jin Gabolinscy is welcomed. 
If there was a discussion of the previous authorities, then their decisions 
would carry greater weight. 
(93) as observed by the learned author McGregor,.. p.1140. 
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Conclusion 
1) Gabolinscy attempted to extend negligent liability into a n
ew area, 
that is to impose a duty of care on the lessor. There was a cu
rious 
omission of the lessor and lessee relationship by Moller J when
 he 
arrived at his conclusion to impose a duty of care on the defen
dant. 
Similarly there was a mysterious omission on this point by Lord
 
Denning in Bottomley. 
2) Moller J pioneered into the novelty area of awarding econom
ic loss in 
New Zealand as Lord Denning did in Dutton (England} under the d
isguise 
of p r operty damage. This spirit and effort by the courts shoul
d be 
commended as the law ought to keep pace with new demands, ana d
evelopment 
of social needs. At the moment only Canada allows recovery for
 pure 
economic loss (94) whilst Spartan v Steel (95) does not favour rec
overy. 
The law is not static, the application of Rivtow depends on the fa
cts 
of the particular case. Until the path is opened Gabolinscy is
 within 
the limits of Lord Denning in Spartan v Steel which is based on
 policy 
considerations. 
3) The award of damages for inconvenience and worry is a step a
head of 
time and is supported by Sachs L.J. in Dutton. Undoubtedly this
 step 
is to be welcomed and if there has been a discussion of previou
s cases 
in this respect the decision would carry more weight. It is fer
vently 
hoped that other jurisdictions would support it. 
As the present law stands, no duty of care is imposed on lessor
 in 
relation to the fitness of the premises. Contrary to this, Mol
ler J did 
impose a duty of care on the defendant (lessor). 
(94) See Rivtow (1973] 6 W.W.R.692. ---
(95) (1973] l Q.B. 27 - the present authoritative decision for 
recovery 
of pure economic loss. 
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It is submitted that this is against the doctrine of precedent 
to disregard long standing authorities which have been approved and 
confirmed by latar cases. Although the cases on leases are anonLalies 
to the Donaghue v Stevenson neighbour principle, it is up to the House 
of Lords or Privy Council to put the matter right. Perhaps the other 
alternative is by legislation. 
• 
r-· 
:s 
(J) 
('\ 
< • 
lii1ii~i!li1i1iilllliiii1 
3 7212 00442956 7 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
L 
•cl er 
Ta 
T ·o, . K. 
Gaholinacy · .. . llE".m:.!.1-
to ~i ty Corpo tion. 
33?, 920 
LAW LI RARY 
A fiFte of 1 Oc per day is 
charged on overdue books 
L . C 
L 
:'older 
Due 
T •Tr, ; . -;r . 
G~o olin~cy v . H ~ · ~-
ton City Co rpor'l t·· on . 
Borrower's Nome 
• 
< • 

